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Neuron
Previewsmany of us to discover that neurexins act
through multiple postsynaptic partners;
now it seems wise to be on the lookout
for new presynaptic effectors
for neuroligins. Given the overwhelming
evidence linking the neurexin-neuroligin
pathway to autism and schizophrenia
(Su¨dhof, 2008), these are key issues not
only for fundamental neuroscience, but
also for understanding and eventually
developing treatments for neuropsychi-
atric disorders.
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In this issue of Neuron, Duan et al. (2015) introduce a novel rodent model of executive control. Their neural
recordings provide direct evidence for the task-set inertia theory and suggest a crucial role for the superior
colliculus in executive control.After hearing a radio report of a traffic
jam as you approach a familiar intersec-
tion on the drive to work, you might opt
to turn right rather than make your usual
left turn to take an alternate route to your
destination. We depend on our ability to
alter our response to the same sensory
input, such as the view of that familiar
intersection, as we receive new infor-
mation or as context changes on a
moment-to-moment basis. Humans are
not the only animals to exhibit this sort
of behavioral flexibility. In fact, non-hu-
man primates have traditionally provided
a powerful model system for studying
cortical activity at the level of individual
neurons during controlled behavior
requiring this type of executive control(Miller, 2000). Now in Neuron, Duan et al.
(2015) devise a rodent model in which an-
imals can be trained to display such
behavior, opening the door to new types
of experiments, at a scale not previously
possible.
One well-established behavioral para-
digm for the study of executive control is
the so-called Pro-/Anti-saccade task
(Munoz and Everling, 2004), in which a
monkey is instructed at the start of each
behavioral trial to respond by directing
its gaze either toward (‘‘Pro’’) or away
from (‘‘Anti’’) a peripheral visual stimulus
that appears later in the trial (Figure 1A).
Rodents are both practically and scientif-
ically appealing, due to their low cost and
the ease of working with them comparedwith primates, coupled with recent tech-
nological breakthroughs in monitoring
and manipulating individual neurons in
intact rodents. There has been a push to
develop more sophisticated behavioral
paradigms for rodents in order to take
advantage of these benefits, but it has
not been clear to what extent they can
be trained to perform tasks that can probe
complex cognitive behaviors such as this
type of executive control.
However, in this issue of Neuron, Duan
et al. (2015) introduce a novel rodent
model of executive control analogous to
the Pro-/Anti-saccade primate paradigm.
In this new paradigm, rats learn two sets
of sensorimotor associations — they
respond to a visual stimulus that may
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Figure 1. A Rodent Model of Rapid Sensorimotor Remapping
Inspired by the well-established pro-/anti-saccade task used to study the roles of various brain regions
such as the prefrontal cortex in executive control in non-human primates (A), Duan et al. (2015) have devel-
oped a novel rodent paradigm (B) analogous to this task.
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Previewsappear on the left or right either by orient-
ing toward it (‘‘Pro’’) or away from it
(‘‘Anti’’) (Figure 1B). This paradigm is
particularly well suited for the study of
rapid sensorimotor remapping, as a sin-
gle-trial switch from Pro- to Anti-oriented
responses requires the same stimulus to
drive opposing behavioral responses on
subsequent trials. Using an automated
procedure, Duan et al. (2015) are able to
train 80% of their subjects to switch
rapidly between Pro and Anti responses,
in both a block configuration and on a
trial-by-trial basis.
One feature of this sort of rapid sensori-
motor remapping is an impairment in
performance, quantified by an increase
in errors and/or reaction time, immedi-
ately following a sensorimotor association
change. Interestingly, performance is
impacted by an association change
regardless of how well-cued the subject
is to the correct association at the onset
of the trial (Monsell 2003). This perfor-
mance deficit, known as ‘‘switch cost,’’
is the focus of a large body of research
on task switching in both human and
non-human primates and has led to two
major hypotheses as to its origin. The first,
‘‘task set reconfiguration,’’ asserts that
the assembly of a new task set is thecognitively demanding aspect of task
switching and cannot be completed until
the arrival of the sensory stimulus from
the new task. In contrast, the second hy-
pothesis, ‘‘task set inertia,’’ assumes
that the cognitive demand is greatest
when dismantling the old task set (Allport
et al., 1994; Monsell et al., 2000).
Notably, Duan et al. (2015) observe
behavioral asymmetries that are both
indicative of the higher cognitive demand
thought to be associated with Anti re-
sponses and consistent with switch cost
asymmetries observed in human and
non-human primates engaged in similar
tasks (Weiler and Heath, 2012). In addi-
tion to being learned more rapidly in
isolation, Pro responses tend to be faster
and more accurate than Anti responses
(Figures 2A and 3A in Duan et al., 2015).
Additionally, the reduction in perfor-
mance accuracy on the first trial of a
new block was significantly larger when
switching from Anti to Pro relative to the
switch from Pro to Anti, and animals
were significantly slower to respond on
the first trial of a new Pro block (Figures
3D and 3E in Duan et al., 2015). These
results indicate that the Anti task is
more difficult than Pro, and they show
that switching from the more difficult toNeuron 8the easier task does indeed result in a
larger switch cost.
One benefit of a rodent model for a
complex cognitive ability such as execu-
tive control is that it allows for direct
manipulations of neural activity at the cir-
cuit level across many subjects. To inves-
tigate neural mechanisms relevant to the
observed behaviors, Duan et al. (2015)
conducted reversible inactivations of
two brain areas likely to be involved in
Pro-/Anti-saccade responses by deliv-
ering the GABA-A agonist muscimol via
bilaterally implanted cannulae in the su-
perior colliculus (SC) and prelimbic cortex
(PL), a part of the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC). The superior colliculus is a
midbrain structure with input layers that
receive connections from a majority of
retinal ganglion cells and project to motor
output layers and is known to be involved
in the generation of saccades and in visual
orienting behavior in general (Felsen and
Mainen, 2008). As such, it is well posi-
tioned to drive rapid responses toward a
visual target, as in the Pro task. The
mPFC has been shown to be involved in
Anti responding in both humans and
non-human primates engaged in the
Pro-/Anti-saccade task (Munoz and Ever-
ling, 2004). In the rat, the PL region of the
mPFC appears to play a role in the inhibi-
tion of incorrect responses and top-down
control of behavior in general (Narayanan
et al., 2006; Rich and Shapiro 2009) and is
therefore a good candidate structure to
drive performance on the presumably
more cognitively demanding Anti task.
Based on these observations, Duan
et al. (2015) hypothesized that SC inacti-
vation would selectively impair perfor-
mance on the Pro task, while PL inactiva-
tion would impair Anti performance and
leave Pro performance intact.
As predicted, PL inactivation did prefer-
entially impact performance on the Anti
task. Although both Pro and Anti perfor-
mance were negatively affected by either
unilateral or bilateral muscimol infusion to
the PL, Anti performance was substan-
tially more impaired (Figures 6C, 7Aii,
and 7Cii in Duan et al., 2015). The results
from SC inactivation were much more
surprising. Unilateral SC inactivation
impaired orientation contralateral to the
inactivated side and improved orientation
responses ipsilateral to the inactivated
side, regardless of the task being6, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1325
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Previewsperformed (Figures 6A and 6B in Duan
et al., 2015). This is consistent with the
expected role of the SC in generating ori-
enting movements, but it does not distin-
guish between the possibility that it is
crucial for Pro responses in particular
from an overall orienting deficit. Bilateral
SC inactivation revealed the surprising
result—in a direct contradiction of the
predicted effect, performance on Pro tri-
als recovered during bilateral SC inactiva-
tion and was not significantly different
from saline-infused controls (Figures 7Ai
and 7Bi in Duan et al., 2015). This obser-
vation is in opposition to the hypothesis
that the SC is necessary for driving Pro re-
sponses. Even more surprising, bilateral
SC inactivation robustly impaired perfor-
mance on the Anti trials in all animals,
regardless of their baseline performance
on the Anti task (Figure 7Ci in Duan
et al., 2015). This result suggests an unex-
pected role for the SC in addition to the
PFC in generating cognitively demanding
Anti responses.
The preferential impairment of Anti
performance during SC and PL inactiva-
tions presented a unique opportunity to
directly test the contrasting hypotheses
over the origin of the switch cost. Anti
performance is preferentially impaired
by either SC or PL inactivation, suggest-
ing that these manipulations are selec-
tively disrupting circuits important for
Anti behavior and that both of these re-
gions are potentially representing the
Anti task set. The task set inertia hypoth-
esis predicts that strongly activated task
sets are more difficult to eliminate in or-
der to facilitate task switching, and it
further assumes that more difficult tasks
require more support in memory and1326 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevistronger activation in general, and so
should be more effected by task set
inertia. Therefore, if dismantling the exist-
ing task set is the true source of the
switch cost as predicted by the task set
inertia hypothesis, the switch cost should
be higher when switching away from the
more challenging task (Allport et al.,
1994). The higher switch cost observed
when switching from Anti to Pro com-
pared to switches in the other direction
is consistent with this hypothesis, but it
does not provide any direct causal evi-
dence. Remarkably, inactivation of either
the SC or the PL significantly reduces,
and in some cases eliminates, the cost
of switching from Anti to Pro trials, while
leaving the cost of switching from Pro to
Anti unchanged (Figure 8 in Duan et al.,
2015). To our knowledge, this is the first
direct evidence that switch cost is a
result of task set inertia in any model
system.
In addition to providing direct support
for a long-standing hypothesis on the
origin of switch cost, these results
constitute a significant addition to the
understanding of neural mechanisms for
executive control. Crucially, they indicate
an unexpected role for the SC in Anti
performance. This observation argues
strongly against a widely held view that
suppression of SC responses, likely
coming from the PFC, are necessary to
suppress Pro responses and allow for
correct Anti performance (Johnston and
Everling, 2006). Instead, the findings re-
ported by Duan et al. (2015) are consis-
tent with other recent challenges to that
inhibition model, and they indicate that
SC activation is also necessary for
good performance on the Anti task. Theer Inc.nature of the interactions between the
SC and PL were not investigated directly
in this study. Ultimately, circuit-level
perturbations will be necessary to fully
understand the neural mechanisms sup-
porting executive control in general, and
to uncover the origins of switch cost in
particular. Fortunately, a rodent model
for the study of executive control, as re-
ported here, will facilitate studies of
those interactions and it will allow for
other direct causal manipulations of cir-
cuits necessary for complex cognitive
tasks at an unprecedented level of preci-
sion and scale.
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